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Editorial
It’s an honour to serve as the guest editor of this issue
of The Reasoner and to share the following interview with
Katharine Mach, Director of the Stanford Environmental As-
sessment Facility, Senior Research Scientist in the Department
of Earth Systems Science at Stanford University, and Visit-
ing Investigator at the Carnegie Institute for Science. Mach’s
work intersects with many topics of interest to readers of
The Reasoner, including uncertainty representation, evidence
aggregation, expert elicitation and deliberation, decision un-
der uncertainty, and communication across various sectors.
On top of her day-to-day research, she has been deeply in-
volved in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change as (among other responsibilities) a co-director of sci-
ence for the Working Group 2 contribution to the Fifth As-
sessment Report (2014) and co-author of the Guidance Note
for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on
Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties. The following are ex-
cerpts from a longer interview conducted as part of a se-
ries of interviews with researchers and practitioners from a
range of fields on topics re-
lating to decision under un-
certainty (All interviews will
be available soon on the
project webpage: https:
//desevun.org). I spoke
to Mach on the sidelines of
the workshop Coping with
Uncertainty: Normative Ap-
proaches, Current Practice,





Interview with Katharine Mach
Casey Helgeson How would you describe your field of
research?
Katharine Mach I’m broadly interested in how knowledge
interfaces with decisions, and I would describe my field of
research as integrative assessment of climate change risks and
options. And as a field, it’s inherently interdisciplinary. It’s
basically saying there are many complex problems relevant to
societies in real time where we have lots of different lines of
evidence that can be integrated to provide a depiction of the
state of knowledge to support choices and actions. Often times
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those evaluations of what we know and what we don’t are
really assisted by bringing experts together with decision mak-
ers in the process of assessment. So another way of thinking
of assessment is that it’s synthesis science supporting solu-
tions, where you have experts interacting with decision makers.
CH: Can you talk about
the methods or techniques
involved in the type of
assessment you do?
KM: So I think of there
being four pillars in the
space of assessing climate
change risks and options that
are particularly interesting.
And they’re especially rele-
vant when you’ve got con-
tested priorities and deep un-
certainties that will be persis-
tent.
Pillar number one is that good climate change assessment –
getting at what we know and what we don’t – has to integrate
different lines of evidence. And that can be incredibly challeng-
ing. You can say in a stylised way that it involves integrating
results that are quantitative, like numerical projections out of
models, with understanding that’s a lot more qualitative. So
when you have your best available projections of possible fu-
tures and then you need to use them to inform decision making,
the question becomes ‘What about all the processes not in those
models?’, ‘What about the limits?’.
A second priority in assessment is how you apply expert
judgement. And there are really fascinating extended disci-
plines that are devoted to how we can think about judgement
– what’s objective?, what’s subjective?, how can you elicit that
person-by-person?, how can you tap group convenings? – but
applying rigorous expert judgement is in many ways the chal-
lenge and the opportunity of assessment, and is something that
happens individually and in groups.
A third big part of climate change assessment is how we un-
fold possible futures and how they link to our current decisions
and actions. The traditional model is predict-then-act: you spell
out, for example, a few global-scale futures of what happens
if we continue with high emissions of heat-trapping gasses as
compared to really ambitiously reigning in those emissions.
Those are helpful for organising research communities, but
they’re not necessarily very effective at getting at what infor-
mation people need to make good decisions. So you can also
tap other scenario approaches – scenarios evaluating extreme
possibilities, or scenarios that start with the decision and then
find worlds in which goals are met versus missed – and also
scenario-based approaches that are much more interactive, not
just a scientific projection that is then passed out into the world,
but something that brings experts and decision makers together.
The final pillar is really thinking about those expert–decision
maker–stakeholder interactions in processes of assessment
to build shared knowledge of what questions are relevant to
choices about, for example, how we decarbonise our economy,
or how we prepare for risks in coastal areas that are flooding,
and then in an interactive, iterative way, shape understanding
of the state of knowledge towards those decision-relevant
questions.
CH: And how does assessment then feed into decision
making?
KM: Climate change assessments – whether it’s the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), national
assessments, or even city-scale assessments – are trying to
provide the state of knowledge to support complex decisions
that will have persistent uncertainties. So then the next
question is ‘How do you think about the possible influence
of those assessments on decision making?’. And it’s actually
been a somewhat in-depth field of inquiry. About 15 years
ago there was a rather big evaluation led out of the Harvard
Kennedy school that was trying to understand the influence of
environmental assessments to date. And they started with the
idea that you would see an assessment of a complex problem,
and then there would be a policy in place that hadn’t been
there before, or some concrete change in behaviour – and that
would be the definition of an influential assessment. And what
became really clear is that assessments of climate change or
other environmental issues where you’ve got these persistent
uncertainties have a much more complex interaction with
decision making and society as compared to an ‘assessment
happens, world changes’ type of model. Often times they’re
really just giving you an understanding, a framing of the issue,
so that you can put together the basis of agreed-upon facts.
And that can be a major advance of assessment, to say ‘Here’s
the state of knowledge’, and then in terms of our options on
the table for climate change mitigation, here are the ones
that come down to choices around leadership as compared to
choices around costs as compared to taking the issue of climate
change mitigation and making it into a business opportunity.
Or some other decision makers might say ‘Well, our entry
point is actually going to be more about the co-benefits:
the way that climate change mitigation affects everything
else that society is trying to achieve’. So I would say that
the major advances in this space have been recognising that
informing decisions under severe uncertainty is often about
separating understanding that’s more objective as compared
to how that understanding interfaces with different goals so
that people can hope to parse the complexities moving forward.
CH: What is the role of stakeholders in assessment?
KM: A good assessment is as much about the process of the
assessment as compared to the products. And a good process
brings experts in interaction with the decision makers from
square one. Rob Lempert this morning spoke about of the
importance of convening power. Why are people coming to-
gether? Do they have a reason to be interacting around a given
decision? So for example, the IPCC has interacted with the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
because it is in many ways the ultimate body for coming up
with a global treaty to address climate change. There are many
other ways that that happens, so in my California context for
example, there is very high ambition at the state level of com-
ing up with a strategy for deep decarbonisation and achieving
it over the next decade and two. So they’re looking to use
interactions between experts and decision makers at that state
scale to come up with a basis of knowledge upon which they
can develop policy. At the very start, you’re saying ‘Well, what
are the rules of this assessment process?’, and the process will
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be effective if those rules are agreed upon by decision makers
coming together with some clear convening power and experts
understanding those rules. That interaction between experts
and decision makers first of all starts around what questions
can be addressed in the assessment process, what information
do decision makers need, and how can you think about how
that interfaces with different lines of evidence available. Often
times decision makers, or stakeholders more broadly defined,
will provide inputs on the developing assessment – whether
it’s a report or a presentation of evidence in different forms –
as it’s being developed, really indicating ‘Is it useful?’. And
then at the end, if an assessment has worked well, in many
cases the product of an assessment – a report or a data base –
is just the beginning, and the assessment becomes the basis for
sustained dialogue through time that can inform that process
of learning that’s inherent to virtually any decision or policy
process around climate change risks and options.
CH: What are you working on now?
KM: There are two areas that I’m prioritising in my research
on assessment, really trying to advance the science of assess-
ment through trying new things and evaluating them in real
time. So one that I’ve been focusing on very heavily is this
integration of quantitative and qualitative evidence. As a spe-
cific example there, the project that I’m now launching through
an assessment initiative at Stanford is looking at the linkages
between climate change and violent conflict. And it’s a bit
of a challenging field in that if you take more quantitative ap-
proaches, for example through statistical approaches drawing
from econometrics, you can see in some cases strong linkages
between weather variation – a really hot decade, or a really dry
year – and an increased likelihood of violent conflict breaking
out. In some approaches statistically you can see that linkage,
and in others you see that it’s not there necessarily at all times.
And then if you jump to understanding process through more
qualitative or case study-based approaches, putting all of those
different lines of evidence together is incredibly challenging
because it ranges from ‘climate change potentially has a very
large effect on outbreaks of violent conflict’ all the way through
to ‘everything else seems to be way more important and it’s
hard to even point to any impact of climate change on violent
conflict’. So integrating quantitative and qualitative evidence in
that kind of a circumstance is as hard as assessment gets, and
it’s a place where I actually think there’s big opportunity for
advancing our approaches to assessment.
And the second thing that I’ll emphasise is related to what
needs to advance, from my perspective. I think what often
happens in different climate change assessments is you bring
experts together, you put them around the table, and you
assume that rationality just magically emerges – that you
have transparent revealing of top insights in a group process.
But actually what happens when you bring experts together
is sometimes a magnification of the types of biases we all
are prone to in making judgement. Those types of dynamics
get amplified in group deliberations so that they often are
both overconfident and conservative. And in something like
violent conflict where different research approaches give you
really different answers, bringing people together right off
the bat often leads to a whole lot of disagreement and missed
opportunities for using some of the methods that exist to get at
individual expert perspectives – so for example through expert
elicitation – and then combining that with the benefits that can
happen around a more open-ended discussion among groups
of experts.
CH: If pressed for general practical advice on how deep
or persistent uncertainties should be dealt with in a decision
process, what are the most important messages you would
want to get across?
KM: I will use two examples of general practical advice,
where I’ve been at this interface of an assessment happening in
real time, or just being brought to completion, and there being
decisions that are taken.
So one was at the global scale. Following the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the IPCC that came out in 2014, there was in
real time an interaction with the Paris agreement that was being
negotiated at that time. And there was a request from the UN-
FCCC to have what’s called a structured expert dialogue, where
– it was actually over the course of two years – experts came
together with decision makers, where the decision makers were
the parties to the international climate negotiations and the ex-
perts were largely from the IPCC, but also from other contexts.
And the discussion was in essence ‘What should the long term
global goal be for the Paris agreement?’ Should it be stay-
ing ‘well below 2 degrees celsius’, or should adaptation to cli-
mate change (preparing for impacts and risks) come into that?
How do you think about the architecture in which adaptation
and mitigation link together with sustainable development as a
whole? And so the key thing there was that it was a dialogue. It
was open-ended. It wasn’t something where there’s an answer
provided to decision makers. It was strongly recognised that
when Trinidad and Tobago versus Saudi Arabia had questions
on the evidence, they wanted to explore ‘What does this mean
for small island nations that are particularly vulnerable to sea
level rise?’ as compared to ‘How do we think about stranded
assets and what that means for fossil fuel exporting nations?’.
So that was something where the key aspect was an emphasis
on dialogue and there not necessarily being a right scientific an-
swer, but there being different ways that the state of knowledge
interfaces with the choices on the table.
One more example that I’ll give relates to work we’re now
doing within the state of California. California has a goal to
reduce its emissions by 40% by 2030. This is decarbonisation
very similar to what Europe is aiming to achieve as a whole
in terms of its pledges put forward under the Paris agreement,
and that plays out differently, country by country. It’s deep
decarbonisation with the emissions dive really starting to
happen. And there, it’s not only dialogue, it’s also figuring out
‘How will learning happen through time?’. We can evaluate the
risks, we can evaluate our options in responding to them, but
as implementation starts to happen and decisions are translated
into action on the ground, assessment really has a new mandate
to rise up to, which is ‘How do you inform processes of
learning through time?’, recognising that we have no ability
to say exactly how prices will drop over a multi-decadal time
frame, or which technologies will end up being the winners.
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In Defense of Brogaard-Salerno Stricture
Brogaard and Salerno (2008: Counterfactuals and con-
text, Analysis 68(1), 39–46) argued that counter-examples
to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent, and
hypothetical syllogism in-
volving subjunctive condi-
tionals only seem to work be-
cause they involve a contex-
tual fallacy where the context
assumed in the premise(s) is
illicitly shifted in the conclu-
sion. To avoid such counter-
examples they have proposed
that the context must remain
fixed when evaluating an ar-
gument for validity. That is
the Brogaard-Salerno Stric-
ture.
The condition imposed by the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture—
BSS, for short—seems to be ‘a basic tenet of standard seman-
tics’. Tristan Haze (2016: Against the Brogaard-Salerno Stric-
ture, The Reasoner 10(4), 29–30), however, has recently ob-
jected that intuitively valid argumentative forms such as con-
junction introduction do not satisfy BSS. He presents the fol-
lowing counter-example:
(P1) If Mary had not had breakfast, she would have
lunched sooner. (P2) If John had worn black shoes,
he would have worn black socks. (C) Therefore, if
Mary had not had breakfast, she would have lunched
sooner, and if John had worn black shoes, he would
have worn black socks.
The context—Haze suggests—does not remain fixed, since
(P1) and (P2) involve different contextually determined back-
ground facts. But since the argument is still intuitively valid,
BSS cannot be correct.
I’m not convinced by that argument. Haze’s claim is that
(P1) and (P2) have different ‘background facts’. But they have
different background facts just in virtue of being premises about
different topics, and nothing in BSS prevents premises to be
about different topics insofar as they can be part of a single and
constant context. BSS solely poses a constraint upon shifting
the context, i.e., upon using more than a single context when
evaluating arguments for validity. This constraint is not vio-
lated in Haze’s argument: the context we use to evaluate the
truth of the conclusion is the same as the context used to eval-
uate the truth of the premises. Thus, it cannot be a counter-
example to BSS.
For comparative purposes, let’s put Haze’s argument in a sit-
uation where a violation of BSS does occur. Suppose the con-
text in which we evaluate the premises is composed by the fol-
lowing facts: Mary is on a special diet that requires her to have
light bites every couple of hours; John has an OCD that pro-
pels him to always match his socks with his black shoes. Given
these background facts, the premises are true. Now, suppose
that the context in which we evaluate the conclusion involves
slightly different facts: Mary has to fast the entire morning and
John’s OCD impels him to match black socks with his black
shoes only on Sundays. If one now uses conjunction of intro-
duction to draw an inference from (P1) and (P2) to (C), the
argument becomes invalid. That is precisely what BSS would
predict, after all no single context was kept fixed throughout
our evaluation.
To what is worth, Haze is not denying that contextual restric-
tions need to be placed on argumentation. He does regard de-
termining the proper contextual restrictions on argumentation
an important task. His only concern is that BSS is not up to the
task. However, as I tried to show, BSS seems to do a very good
job when properly understood.
In fact, BSS does more than placing contextual restrictions
on argumentation. It has further interesting consequences not
usually acknowledged. First, as Brogaard and Salerno (2008:
41) show, BSS not only serves to block counter-examples to
instances of unpopular argumentative forms such as contrapo-
sition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism
that involve subjunctive conditionals. It is also the only way
to avoid counter-examples to instances of the venerable modus
ponens.
Second, as noticed by Lycan (1999: It’s Immaterial (A Reply
to Sinnott-Armstrong). Philosophical Papers, 28(2), 133–136),
if we keep the context fixed when evaluating the validity of
arguments, counter-examples to contraposition, strengthening
the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism involving indicative
conditionals all disappear. In fact, even counter-intuitive clas-
sical argumentative forms such as the paradoxes of the material
conditional are valid when the context is kept fixed. For in-
stance, from ‘John will not drink sulfuric acid’ it is legitimate
to conclude that ‘If John drinks sulfuric acid, he will gain su-
per powers’. The conclusion is false only in a context where
the antecedent is true; but I cannot assume the conclusion’s an-
tecedent is true without illicitly shifting the context and disre-
garding that the antecedent was false in the premise. Thus, BSS
seems to support argumentative forms from classical logic.
If the reasoning above is correct, it would give us a reason
to accept the truth-functional hypothesis, according to which
indicative conditionals of the natural language and the material
conditional of classical logic have the same truth conditions.
The fact that classical argumentative forms that involve indica-
tive conditionals are valid under BSS provides a reason to think
that indicative conditionals are material. After all, how else
would we be able to explain this match between formal logic
and natural language if indicative conditionals weren’t mate-
rial?
Perhaps even more interestingly, a similar reasoning to the
above can be used to defend that subjunctive conditionals are
material. After all, classical argumentative forms involving
subjunctive conditionals are also valid under BSS, as shown by
Brogaard and Salerno’s discussion of some counter-examples
to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypotheti-
cal syllogism involving subjunctive conditionals. All suggests
that a similar defense would work with the paradoxes of the
material conditional involving subjunctive conditionals. The
paradoxes of material conditional ensure that from the premise
‘John will not drink sulfuric acid’ it is legitimate to conclude
that ‘If John had drunk sulfuric acid, he would have gained su-
per powers’. The conclusion is only false when the antecedent
is true, but the premise is only true when the antecedent is false.
Thus, there seems to be a promising route indicating that BSS
also implies that subjunctive conditionals are material. Pursu-
ing this route, however, is a task for another occasion.
Matheus Silva
Federal University of Santa Maria
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News
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Behavioral Eco-
nomics, 22–23 May
On the 22nd and 23rd of May, an interdisciplinary workshop
took place at the University of Helsinki, Finland. It was orga-
nized by Magdalena Malecka and Michiru Nagatsu from TINT,
Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
For two days, researchers
from different disciplines
got together in the “Forest
House” of the University
of Helsinki to reflect upon
some of the issues that
affect behavioral economics
nowadays. As the title of
the workshop suggests, the




In the opening speech, the
organizers explained that their aim was to encourage a philos-
ophy of science reflection on foundational issues in behavioral
economics.
Other questions that were addressed during the two days
were for instance: What is the state of the art of the field? What
is the relation of behavioral economics to orthodox economics?
And why do we care about these questions after all?
The workshop had a lineup of speakers mainly from philos-
ophy, economics, and sociology, with expertise in the history
and philosophy of economics or with specific interests in the
foundations and development of behavioral economics.
Participants (roughly around 80 people) were mixed in terms
of discipline, affiliation and age. People arrived from every-
where: Moscow, Seattle, Ottawa, Madison, plus several Euro-
pean cities. The attendants ranged from young PhD candidates
to more established Professors. As part of the audience, sev-
eral MA students from different faculties attended the work-
shop too. There were also people from research institutes out-
side the university.
This mix brought a particularly nice atmosphere to the event.
This was made possible in part by the fact that there were no
parallel sessions, something that helped to have a coherent dis-
cussion. On the other hand, the workshop was relatively large
and it was a bit of a marathon: we had roughly 10 talks per day,
including two keynote speakers.
I was among those participants who first believed that some
of the attendants were keynote speakers: Wade Hands, Daniel
Hausman, Don Ross. It turned out that none of them was! In
fact, they were there either because they submitted an abstract
or just because they were interested in the topic. I experienced
this as particularly positive about the workshop: TINT man-
aged to attract submissions for contributed papers from many
leading figures in the field, who would otherwise have been
great candidates for keynote speakers themselves. This also de-
termined that the overall quality of the contributions was very
high.
The two keynote speakers were Erik Angner (University of
Stockholm) and Arno Riedl (Maastricht University). The title
of Erik’s talk was “We are all behavioral economists now”. In
this talk, Erik gave a description of the state of the art of behav-
ioral economics as a research program essentially in line with
neoclassical economics. This view is gaining terrain in the lit-
erature: for example, even with important differences, the Stan-
ford economist Raj Chetty in his 2015 AEA lecture argued on
similar lines, that we should take a pragmatic interpretation of
behavioral economics assumptions, a´ la Friedman.
Arno Riedl’s talk was entitled “Human Social Behavior:
Brains and Institutions”. In this talk, he gave a very informative
overview on two strands of experiments he has been conduct-
ing: one strand adopts techniques from neuroscience to inves-
tigate neural mechanisms underlying pro-social behaviors; and
the other adopts new experimental designs to study ?spill over?
effects of institutions on pro-social behaviors.
To have a more detailed idea of the topics of the talks, the ab-
stracts can be found on the web page of the workshop. More-
over, the organizers are planning to publish a journal special
issue with contributed papers.
Broadly speaking, a general observation may frame the over-
all debate, even if at the cost of simplifying it a bit. One speaker
in the History of Science session (Vladimir Avtonomov, Na-
tional Research University-Moscow) provided an interpretation
of the history of economics as a discipline where two canons
tend to replace each other over time, on the basis of differ-
ent views about the degree of abstractions that is permissible
in economics (it?s more complicated than this, but grant me
the simplification for the sake of this summary). On the one
hand, one canon is more general, based on deductive principles
and the assumptions of homo oeconomicus; the other canon,
in contrast, is less abstract, based on direct empirical observa-
tions, and takes into account the specific motivations behind
economic behavior.
In some respects, this very contrast emerged during the
workshop as well. There were some talks that defended a theo-
retically driven approach to economics, and challenged the at-
tempts to integrate economics with psychology, sociology, or
political science; other scholars favored instead a bottom-up ap-
proach to economics, as, for instance, in the spirit of evidence-
based economics.
To give an example: In one presentation, a speaker (Ar-
mando Mene´ndez Viso, University of Oviedo) quoted a pas-
sage from Richard Thaler’s book “Misbehaving” (2015), ac-
cording to which “without the rational framework there are no
anomalies from which we can detect misbehavior” (p. 251).
The following day, another speaker (Michael Joffe, University
College London) objected Thaler’s view, claiming that the ra-
tional choice framework should be abandoned altogether. This
is because, if we start from a theory and don’t find results in
accordance with it, then there is no puzzle, it’s just that the real
world doesn’t correspond to the theory that we formulated of
it. When this happens, it’s too bad for the theory. Yet, several
questions came from the audience asking how in practice we
should proceed without a rational framework, even only as an
organizing principle, and what the risks of abandoning it are,
such as to end up with a bunch of isolated effects, etc.
After the talk on the two canons, someone in the audience
asked about the take-home message: should we thus think that
there is no progress in economics? That it is a continuous re-
currence of two competing views and that we are not moving
forward but in a circle? And again, the speaker replied that, as
we philosophers know, progress is a tricky, difficult issue. How
do we evaluate progress? What is it really?
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The discussion continued on the question whether we should
see the rational choice theory paradigm in a similar way as
Ptolemaic theory: we know that it’s wrong, but until we have
a Copernicus in economics, we will hold to that view. Some
people objected that the parallel with physics doesn?t hold, be-
cause of the normative aspects of economics that make it more
urgent to solve the dispute.
To conclude, it was encouraging to see that the economists
were debating philosophical questions, and that even more than
others, they welcomed excursions to other fields and methods,
as for instance from psychology, sociology and anthropology.
It is rarely the case that a workshop is so illuminating and
thought provoking. It offers a good example of the great work
that has been done in the last years at TINT and that its mem-
bers will continue to do in the future.
Chiara Lisciandra
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
Fifth LSE Graduate Conference in Philosophy of
Probability, 2-3 June
The Fifth LSE Graduate
Conference in Philosophy of
Probability took place on 2-
3 June 2017 at the Centre
for Philosophy of the Natu-
ral and Social Science, LSE.
This was a philosophy of sci-
ence graduate conference ad-
dressing students in Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Physics,
Medicine, Computer Science, and related fields.
The keynote speakers were Julia Staffel (Washington Uni-
versity St. Louis), Anna Mahtani (LSE), Maria Carla Galavotti
(University of Bologna), and Sylvia Wenmackers (University
of Leuven). We accepted eight graduate speakers, and all of
them had members of staff from the LSE (and Sylvia Wen-
mackers) as commentators.
The first day started with Maria Carla Galavotti’s talk. A
veryengagingsurvey of the history of probability was given:
from its birth to its current different interpretations. Several
famous names were mentioned, including Donald A. Gillies,
who was an audience member! A lively Q&A followed the talk,
with questions about the origins of axiomatization in probabil-
ity theory sparking an interesting debate.
There were two more talks in the morning: Dean McHugh,
Grzegorz Lisowski & Max Rapp (Amsterdam), who talked
about inquisitive semantics and the lottery paradox, and a com-
ment was offered by Roman Frigg (LSE), and Pablo Zende-
jas Medina (Pittsburgh) who talked about whether or not one
should always accept cost-free information, and a comment
was offered by Campbell Brown (LSE).
In the afternoon, there were two more talks by graduate
speakers: Jeremy Steeger (Notre Dame), who talked about a
quantum version of the probabilists’ Dutch book theorem, and
had as a commentator Miklo´s Re´dei (LSE), and Alexander
Carver & Paolo Turrini (Imperial), who talked about the influ-
ence of paths in the levels of segregation in the Schelling Seg-
regation Model, and had as commentator Peter Sozou (LSE).
The firstday endedon a high notewith Sylvia Wenmackers’s
talk on infinitesimal probabilities, and on the possibility of as-
signing non-zero infinitesimal probabilities to remote contin-
gencies. This was a very interesting talk, and quite entertaining
too: ‘I heart infinitesimals’ was seen floating around in one
of the slides. Additionally, the interest in infinitesimals was
incredibly well motivated, which made the importance of the
talk very clear. There was also a reference to the fact that both
Sylvia and Julia (Staffel) were graduate speakers in an earlier
edition of this conference, with Matt Parker (also a commenta-
tor at this edition and a member of the audience) having been
Sylvia’s commentator at the time!
After the talks, there was opportunity to talk more about
probabilities (and other things as the level of consumed wine
increased) at the conference dinner.
The second day started with Anna Mahtani’skeynotetalk.
Anna spoke about vague credence as an alternative to impre-
cise probabilism. It all started with one’s credence in “Sar-
dines” (“Should you have a precise credence in the proposition
that the neighbour has a box of sardines?”), and then a claim
was made that instead of viewing the content of your credence
as a set of probability functions, we should instead take the ex-
pression “credence” to be vague. The Q&A was very lively and
some questions had to be postponed until the coffee break.
In the morning there were two other talks by invited graduate
speakers: Milana Kostic (MCMP) talked about updating with
restrictor conditionals, and Sylvia Wenmackers commented on
her paper, and Gary Mullen (Leeds) discussed the no option
puzzled, and had as a commentator Richard Bradley (LSE).
After lunch, two more invited gradate speakers: Boris Babic
(Michigan) talked about generalised entropy and epistemic risk,
and Matt Parker (LSE) commented on his paper, and finally the
last graduate speaker was James Wilson (Bristol), who talked
about accuracy and probability kinematics, and had Anna Mah-
tani as a commentator.
The conference ended with Julia Staffel’s talk on a puzzle
about outright beliefs. Julia offered a new hypothesis about
how beliefs change across contexts and showed how her ac-
count better explains how we reason and update both graded
and outright beliefs. The Q&A was again very lively, and Julia
was very happy to hear everyone and take their suggestions on
board.
The day ended with informal drinks at the White
Horse, at the LSE, and everyone seemed happy whether
it was because they enjoyed the conference or because
they were relieved it was over, I am not sure. I
think there is a high probability that it was the former!
Goreti Faria
London School of Economics and Political Science
Simulation and Thought Experiment, 8–9 June
The Geneva Centre for Philosophy of Science (Michal
Hladky, Guillaume Schlaepfer, Marcel Weber) in collabora-
tion with the DFG-SNSF Research Unit “What-if?” has or-
ganised a conference on Simulations and thought experiments
[simthexp.wordpress.com] that took place at the University of
Geneva on the 8th and the 9th of June 2017.
Simulations and thought experiments are used across scien-
tific disciplines to produce and explore new theories, explana-
tory hypotheses and arguments that may guide us to new ex-
periments and ultimately to new knowledge. Speakers have ex-
plored the similarities and differences of these notions from the
44
perspectives of philosophy of science, epistemology and phi-
losophy of mind. Several have noted that the traditional litera-
ture in philosophy of science has attributed a special status to
experiments, which in turn shaped the discussion about (com-
puter) simulations on one hand and thought experiments on the
other. More recent discussions show that the epistemic primacy
of experiments can not stay undisputed and that it would be
useful to analyse the common structure of real (RE), numerical
(NE) and thought experiments (TE) (Arcangeli, El Skaf). On
the other hand, imagination is often seen as less constraining
than computer simulations, but Anouk Barberousse has con-
vincingly challenged this view.
Rawad El Skaf and Daniel Dohrn have focused on the com-
mon structure of TEs and their epistemic dimensions. In his
excellent presentation, Dohrn reconstructed Schlick’s criterion
establishing whether a question is meaningful. Schlick’s test
is based on TEs and demonstrated their utility even in the em-
piricists’ framework. Contrary to the usual accounts restricting
TEs to in principle executable experiments or reducing them
to arguments, El Skaf’s account shows that TEs are sui-generis
tools to first reveal inconsistencies and then to resolve them. As
TEs often introduce underspecified scenarios, their nomologi-
cal (im)possibility is not under question and does not affect the
unfolding of the TE. It is after the obtention of the result of a TE
that several options to resolve the contradiction are considered.
The removal of the contradiction brings about new theoretical
knowledge.
Margherita Arcangeli has provided an analysis that presup-
poses a common structure of REs/NEs/TEs. Arcangeli drew
distinctions between them based on the role of mental simula-
tions (MS) at the performance level. MS may refer to two dif-
ferent capacities: mental modelling (objectual MS) and imagin-
ing (mental MS). Imagining being crucial for the performance
of TEs. Moreover, TEs call for MS in a way that both NEs
and REs do not, although MS can have a role to play in their
elaboration. Arcangeli exposed also the connection between
the narrative aspects common to REs, NEs, TEs and the role of
imagination.
Similar distinctions were introduced by Nenad Miscevic who
presented thought experimenting in political philosophy. Mis-
cevic distinguished between a tradition that imagines political
arrangements from the 3rd person perspective (Plato, Al Farabi,
T. More, Fourrier, Cohen), and another from the 1st person
perspective (Contractualists: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant,
Rawls, Scanlon). This division fits within the mental model
view of thought experiments where 1st person perspective is
tied to the specific kind of mental models that he dubbed men-
tal simulations.
Anouk Barberousse considered that simulations (NE) are
more than TE in silico. Computational constraints impose lim-
its on NE, which the power of imagination appears to escape,
she argued. Nevertheless, computed results can take us much
farther than our imagination capacities.
Michael Stuart questioned the epistemic continuity thesis,
which claims that there is an epistemic continuity between RE,
TE and NE. According to Stuart, the epistemic continuity thesis
holds if one considers the epistemic role of producing under-
standing. He also suggested that developing a better account of
imagination is the way to better explain this phenomenon.
The notion of simulation was at the centre of the naturalis-
tic account of nonnatural representation provided by Gualtiero
Piccinini. It was shown that the standard accounts are not able
to provide an analysis of states with propositional content that
is not in the actual environment of an organism. The usual anal-
ysis of imagination, planning, hypothetical thought and coun-
terfactual reasoning leads to attribution of a malfunction. Pic-
cinini’s account based on oﬄine simulations of possible envi-
ronments combined with a tracking function of these allows
for an analysis avoiding malfunction attributions and brings us
closer to the naturalistic, mechanistic, neurocomputational ac-
count of intentionality.
Claus Beisbart addressed the question of how RE, TE and
NE support and extend counterfactual reasoning. Beisbart dis-
tinguished between thinking through counterfactual scenarios,
i.e., highly idealized models, and establishing counterfactual
conditionals about real-world systems. The latter being more
difficult to account for. He used a meta-linguistic account and a
possible world semantics of counterfactuals and concludes that
the meta-linguistic account meshes well with the view that TE
and NE are arguments.
A highly interesting formal account of epistemic confir-
mation in the case of analogue simulations was provided by
Stephan Hartmann. The case study is based on analogue simu-
lations of black holes by Bose- Einstein condensates that can be
described by syntactically similar expressions on the pertinent
level, but differ in the underlying micro-physical constitution.
We note, that as simulations are often used in cases in which di-
rect physical manipulation is not feasible, the provided strategy,
if corresponding universality assumptions hold, can be reused
in other empirical disciplines such as neurosciences.
We would like to thank all the speakers for their stimulating
talks, to the participants for rich discussions, to the University
of Geneva, Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), Fon-
dation Mlle Marie Gretler and the DFG-SNSF Research Unit
“What-if?” for their support.
Michal Hladky
Guillaume Schlaepfer
Geneva Centre for Philosophy of Science
Calls for Papers
New Trends in Rational Choice Theory: special issue of Topoi,
deadline 27 August.
Foundations of Clinical Reasoning: An Epistemological
Stance: special issue of Topoi, deadline 31 August.
Knowledge and Justification: New Perspectives: special issue
of Synthese, deadline 1 September.
Reason & Rhetoric in the Time of Alternative Facts: special
issue of Informal Logic, deadline 1 September.
What is a Computer?: special issue of Minds and Machines,
deadline 30 September.
Scientific Discovery and Inferences: special issue of Topoi,
deadline 15 October.
Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and




Teaching an undergrad course in decision theory, I usually
talk about the phenomenon of confounding P(A|B) with P(B|A)
(Ignoring Base Probabilities) with examples as in Kahneman-
Tversky’s works. A few points that I like to mention in class in
this context are:
1. Bayes was aware of the
issue, of course. He used
an argument for the existence
of God which ran roughly
as follows (see McGrayne,
2011): observing the com-
plex (and wonderful?) world
that we live in has con-
ditional probability 1 given
that God exists (if we take
“God” to mean the god of the
scriptures, who created the
world in six days etc.). It’s
hard to assign a conditional
probability to observing this
world (and living in it) if God does not exist, but it stands to
reason that this conditional probability should be small. And
then w’d like to revert the order and ask what’s the probabil-
ity that God exists given the world that we observe, and this
requires a prior on the existence of God. (Notice that this ar-
gument is practically identical to the “Intelligent Design” one.
Considering how many times I mention the word “evolution”
in a typical decision theory class, I think that the Intelligent
Design argument deserves to be mentioned at least once.)
2. There is little doubt that some type of reasoning that al-
lows one to infer causes from effects is very basic. For example,
our daily experiences show that babies as well as pets can look
for the source of a change in light or of a sudden noise. They
seem to be going backwards from high probability of the ef-
fect given the cause to high probability of the cause given the
effect. In this sense probability theory can be viewed as a for-
mal model of ways of reasoning that evolution (!) has equipped
many species with.
3. A relevant question is: Is the above necessarily Bayesian-
style reasoning? Can’t it be explained by something like max-
imum likelihood? The latter has less moving parts and, in par-
ticular, doesn’t require a prior, and has a greater claim to objec-
tivity. However, maximum likelihood is insufficient as a model
of human reasoning. In particular, it needs some subjective in-
put such as preference for simplicity to avoid overfitting. (Larry
Samuelson and I have a paper that attempts to make this point
more rigorously). Relatedly, people do not conceive of all pos-
sible theories, and a model of human reasoning needs to say
something about which theories are likely to pop up in one’s
mind, and probably about some a priori ranking over them. Ev-
idently, this can be done by a subjective prior.
4. There is early evidence for reasoning that can be modeled
as Bayesian, and that is hard to capture by maximum likeli-
hood. The notion of miracles in the Bible is based on this idea:
God wishes to prove His power. He brings about a certain out-
come that is otherwise highly unlikely, and its occurrence is
used to convince the audience of Gods existence, power, etc.
For example, when God tries to convince Moses that he should
lead the people of Israel, negotiate with the Pharaoh, and gen-
erally embark upon a political career Moses has little appetite
for, the latter says,“What if they do not believe me or listen to
me and say, ‘The Lord did not appear to you’?” (Exodus 4, 1).
God then shows him the miracles he is about to perform to con-
vince the people of Israel and the Pharaoh of the greatness of
God, of his choice of Moses as a leader, etc. Notice that, if the
audience were to use maximum likelihood, one wouldn’t need
to resort to extreme measures like turning rods into snakes and
vice versa in order to make the point. It would have sufficed to
pick any sign that is more likely to occur if God is than if He
is not. The point of the miracle is that the observation would
be very unlikely if God did not exist (or wasn’t powerful, or
hadn’t chosen Moses, or) and, because of this, the observation
results in a strong belief in God. The monotonicity of this be-
lief with respect to the “greatness” of the miracle requires more
than maximum likelihood.
5. Finally, to remove any doubt: the point of the above is that
this reasoning, inferring a cause from its effect, can be modeled
by a simple Bayesian model with four states, and it seems to
be an extremely fundamental mode of reasoning. This does
not mean that Bayesian reasoning is always the best way of
modeling how people think, or that it is always rational to think
this way. Sometimes, it takes a miracle to be Bayesian.
Itzhak Gilboa




When thinking of the Middle Ages, reasoning is probably not
the first thing that comes to mind. However, during those
(approximately) ten supposedly “dark“ centuries, there were
times when philosophical speculation achieved a truly impres-
sive level of complexity and technical sophistication, the likes
of which would not be reached again until the 20th century
and onwards. For the Western Latin writing world, this is par-
ticularly true of the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries. Even to
the untrained eye, medieval metaphysics, epistemology, natu-
ral philosophy and logic appear surprisingly familiar but also
radically alien. At a cursory glance at even the less renowned
venues, it is easy to find several interesting snippets of some-
thing that we would recognise as reasoning in a modern sense
and yet it is in a context or with purposes that to a modern
reader would appear unfamiliar or puzzling. For example, in
the 13th century Peter of John Olivi wrote astonishingly artic-
ulated economical treatises (De contractibus, De moneta), that
could be considered forerunners of modern Political Economy.
Around the same time, Ramon Llull composed several works
dealing with electoral systems, grounded upon his (in)famous
Art, which notoriously shows algebraic features and has been
interpreted by some as the medieval version of modern graph-
theory (e.g. A. Bonner, The Art and Logic of Ramon Llull: A
user’s guide, Brill 2007). However Olivi, a Franciscan friar,
was writing about economy mainly to argue in favour of Fran-
ciscan poverty and to warn against the spiritual and material
temptations of money; Llull was concerned, on the one hand,
with outlining a reliable system to select the best abbot for a
convent and, on the other hand, with building a combinatorial
tool for discussing matters of faith in such a convincing way as
to ensure conversions. I could offer many more similar exam-
ples, pointing at several philosophical and theological texts that
would leave us with a similar feeling of recognition and puzzle-
ment: sometimes such puzzlement comes from these theories’
aims or contexts, while at other times it comes from the theories
themselves nonetheless it does not take that initial recognition
away. We understand enough of these somewhat peculiar the-
ories to see that the Dark Ages may not actually be so dark
after all: some of their features still remain foreign and elu-
sive enough to be fascinating, while also leading us to believe
that we might still have something to learn from them. To truly
grasp what was going on and possibly make good of it, the trick
seems to be in the balancing act between puzzlement and recog-
nition. The study of medieval logic stands as a good example.
The historiography of medieval logic is hardly a new field e.g.
Prantl’s Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande was published in
1855 , yet there are still many corners left to be explored.
In the last century, medieval logical theories had already
piqued the interest of both logically minded medievalists and
historically minded logicians. There are several features, com-
mon to medieval logical and philosophical works, that undoubt-
edly justified such an interest. For instance, many of these the-
ories are extremely technical and they are usually structured
systematically as a succession of principles, rules, and proofs.
Moreover, medieval philosophy and logic show a recurring in-
terest in the analysis and clarification of language. In many
medieval logical theories we recognise something astoundingly
familiar and interesting for our own endeavours, be it (among
others) John Buridan’s definition of formality, the widespread
presence of theories that look quite like connexive logics, or
the careful examination of what logically follows within modal,
epistemic, and temporal contexts. A popular way of making
such familiarity more explicit and accessible to modern readers
has been (and still is) to formalise these theories into a symbolic
language. This kind of operation brings together theories that
are distant in time and makes them easier to compare. However,
on the one hand, something always gets lost in translation and
that something might be the really interesting bits. On the other
hand, there are some aspects of medieval logic that just do not
seem to fit properly within any of our contemporary schemes.
Medieval logic appears to be a field that cannot be mapped di-
rectly over contemporary logic however contemporary logic
turns out to be defined, which is itself not very obvious. For
instance, medieval logic is not mathematical, but at least in the
later Middle Ages it is formulated in a highly regimented ver-
sion of (medieval) Latin, which was already at that time a quite
artificial, semi-dead (or semi-living) language. The properties
of this regimented language seem to be an essential aspect of
medieval logic itself on that subject, I recommend having a
look at the recent volume on Formal Approaches and Natural
Language in the Middle Ages, edited by L. Cesalli, F. Goubier
and A. de Libera.
Overall, medieval logic
has several features and aims
that are somewhat unusual
from a certain contemporary
perspective, though not un-
heard of - e.g. a predom-
inant interest in semantics;
pronounced ontological con-
cerns; a pervasive reflection
on ordinary reasoning pro-
cesses and ordinary language
“from within“ (coupled with
the lack of a clear distinction
between logical and meta-
logical language); an empha-
sis on meta-logical and philosophical questions; a centrality of
dialectical procedures, and so on.
Even today many historians of medieval logic themselves
disagree over what medieval logic actually is: contrary to the
“formalisers“, many believe it not to be logic at all. Some
scholars find it to be too deeply rooted within the semantics of
natural language and too “contaminated“ by ontological, gram-
matical and dialectical concerns to be logic in any meaningful
sense, preferring instead to label it as a kind of argumentation
theory. Furthermore, even if we know the details and the me-
chanics of some more technical-looking doctrines, we still lack
a sensible explanation of what’s going on: in some cases, para-
phrasing Paul Vincent Spade, we simply don’t get what me-
dieval logicians are doing. Surprisingly enough, this kind of
assessment tends to be supported more by historians than by
historically minded logicians or philosophers of logic. It is un-
deniable that, especially among the original medieval contri-
butions to the history of logic (the so called logica moderno-
rum, “logic of the moderns“), there are indeed doctrines such
as “obligations“ (obligationes),“expositions“ (expositiones), or
“proofs of propositions“ (probationes propositionum) (a very
interesting workshop on this still understudied topic was held
recently in St. Andrews; you can find the abstracts here) that
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have been quite baﬄing for modern historians. But, once these
doctrines have been properly contextualised, they turn out to
be far less mysterious than they at first seemed. Moreover, nei-
ther the sometimes obscure peculiarities of these doctrines nor
the “expanded“ interests of medieval logic tout court would
lead us to believe that medieval logic has little or nothing to
do with logic at all. Certainly, medieval logical theories are
not akin to abstract mathematical constructs, while broader me-
dieval definitions of the logical field seem to emphasise at an
essential level its connection with actual reasoning. A com-
mon medieval distinction of two (deeply interwoven) parts of
logic could be enlightening: a part of logic, amounting to meta-
logic and philosophy of logic, was the ensemble of theories de-
scribing good reasoning and regulating what it should be (log-
ica docens); the other part, logica utens (literally “using“ or
“practicing“), amounted to actual logical practices and infer-
ential techniques, it was often pronouncedly dialogical and di-
alectical, and included applied logic in plenty of philosophical
and theological contexts. Even if we are ready to admit that
some gaps persist between medieval and contemporary logic, it
is exactly in those murky spaces that some interesting insights
might be waiting. For instance, at least some of the peculiar
features and interests of medieval logic have some analogue in
several recent (and not so recent) developments within our own
logical approaches (e.g. beginning with the comeback of se-
mantics, or within projects like Natural or Informal Logic, etc.)
and within disciplines which, strictly speaking, are bordering to
logic but often claim to have some degree of formality and logic
at their core e.g. Formal Linguistics, Argumentation Theory,
some branches of and approaches to Philosophy, etc. As for the
philosophical and meta-logical discussions of some still con-
troversial topics (for example the nature of logical following,
since, to quote the evergreen Haskell Curry, “no one knows ex-
actly what a logical consequence is“), medieval logic does not
seem to have any evident intrinsic disadvantage against its con-
temporary counterpart; even the use of a regimented version of
Latin could sometimes (such as, for example, for the analysis
of entailments) be a resource. Most importantly, medieval logic
has potential to be an excellent place to think about the relation
between Logic and its own history. Certainly, the mathema-
tisation of logic was, in a sense, an enormous step forward: it
brought great advantages in terms of clarity and manipulability,
and it allowed us to tackle questions and issues that were liter-
ally inconceivable in an Aristotelian or medieval framework. It
might be tempting to dismiss any previous logical approaches
as “illogical“ or at least “diminished“, by claiming that our own
way of doing logic is the one true way. However, such a claim
would be hastily made and possibly unfounded. In one of the
most brilliant and controversial recent publications in the field
(Articulating Medieval Logic, 2014), Terry Parsons demon-
strates that it is possible to give a reformulation of Peano’s first
order arithmetic in a (partially artificial) fragment of medieval
logic, expressed in a language (“Linguish“) modelled on me-
dieval Latin. Parson’s project is interesting both from a histo-
riographical and philosophical point of view. On the one side,
Parsons shows a “third way“ of studying medieval logic from
within, in a philosophically and logically interesting manner,
articulating its properties and reformulating contemporary the-
ories within it rather than going the other way around. On the
other side, by doing so, he argues quite convincingly that me-
dieval logic is indeed logic properly speaking, even by contem-
porary standards: “Historically, symbolic logic did not come
with a seal of approval on it. Instead, it achieved its present sta-
tus by providing a system in which it was possible to formulate
central claims of mathematics and (less evidently) science, in
which the valid derivations correspond to what mathematicians
already recognize as valid reasoning. It is possible then that
some other system of logic might accomplish the same goal,
while being quite different from modern predicate logic. It need
only provide for the formulation of central parts of mathematics
and science.“ (p. 269)
To sum up, medieval logic and medieval reasoning offer
many interesting surprises that go beyond any historical or an-
tiquarian curiosity: in those not so dark centuries we do not
simply find some odd forerunners of fully-fledged contempo-
rary theories, but sometimes an alternative and equally valid
approach, or another point of view on questions and projects
that are still our own. “Logic is eternal, so it can wait“, sup-
posedly said the electrical engineer Oliver Heaviside; however
logic seems to have its own history and we do not have any
good reason to deny nor dismiss it. Logic (and reasoning)
might as well be one of those constructs that Ian Hacking calls
“human kinds“, i.e. “a kind shaped in part by our conception
of it“, and as such it is subject to a “looping effect“: its own
changing, in itself, affects the way we think about it, and the
way we think about it in turn determines what it is. Therefore
thinking about how people reasoned in the Dark Ages might be
time well spent and not just for historians. Who knows? It
could be quite enlightening!
For a more complete and systematic overview have a look
at The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic (2016). Are
you interested in learning about about these topics? Would you
like to discuss them with a group of logicians, historians and
philosophers? Pay a visit to Medieval Logic & Semantics: it’s
the blog for you! Let’s go medieval... on Logic!
Graziana Ciola
Philosophy, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
What’s Hot in . . .
(Formal) Argumentation Theory
My bookshelves are warped
by the weight of books lining
up to be read, but one recent
publication jumped straight
to the head of the priority
queue. Dan Sperber and
Hugo Mercier’s The Enigma
of Reason: A New Theory
of Human Understanding,
summarises a programme of
research building on their 2011 paper: ‘Why do humans rea-
son? Arguments for an argumentative theory’ (in Behavioural
and Brain Sciences). Sperber and Mercier propose that reason-
ing evolved to produce and evaluate arguments when commu-
nicating. It is this understanding of the evolutionary function of
reasoning that underpins a comprehensive explanatory frame-
work for the wealth of psychological evidence suggesting that
reasoning often leads us astray; evidence that contradicts the
view that reasoning typically leads us to more reliable beliefs
and better decisions. However, while their theory explains the
waywardness of the lone reasoner, it also explains why and how
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reasoning keeps us on the path to better beliefs and decisions
when we reason together, in groups and through dialogue.
In a nutshell, their theory argues that reasoning evolved to
support communication. To avoid being misled, it is advanta-
geous for an addressee to evaluate reasons (i.e, arguments) for
the received information, and look for counter-arguments, be-
fore accepting the received information. In turn, it is to the ad-
vantage of the sender that he produce arguments supporting the
information being communicated, in order that it be accepted.
Reasoning thus increases the quantity and epistemic quality of
the information humans are able to share, by allowing commu-
nicators to argue for their claim, and by allowing addressees to
assess these arguments.
This evolutionary function of reasoning implies that a lone
reasoner is disposed to seek reasons in support of his beliefs,
and overlook reasons that argue for the contrary, especially
when such beliefs are contentious and the reasoner anticipates
that they will be challenged. This, for example, manifests in the
classic confirmation bias, which the argumentative theory sug-
gests is a normal feature of reasoning. Moreover, individual
decision makers are disposed to harness reasoning to the ex-
tent that they anticipate communicating their decisions to oth-
ers; hence evidence to the effect that we favour decision options
that can be easily justified and are less at risk of being criticised,
rather than because they satisfy some criterion of rationality.
However, the argumentative theory also implies that rea-
soning serves us better when performed in groups and in
particular when reasoning jointly through dialogue, under the
assumption that interlocutors are motivated to have a common
interest in the truth or the right decision. In these contexts,
the dispositions of speakers and receivers to respectively
seek arguments for claims, and evaluate and seek counter-
arguments, yields better outcomes. That this is so is supported
by evidence reviewed by Sperber and Mercier. These benefits
of dialogical reasoning have, I believe, important implica-
tions for research into logical and computational models of
argument and dialogue (see my review of these models in
the June 2017 issue of The Reasoner). For example, such
models may be developed for deployment in computer systems
engaging students in dialogical interactions, or in supporting
discussion amongst citizens in deliberative democracy. These
use contexts assume an intent to get to the truth of the matter
or make better decisions. A more challenging speculative
use of argumentation technologies, is in the dismantling of
the echo chambers erected by social media. These belief
bubbles arise due to filtering algorithms feeding news and
opinions that entrench people’s ideological positions, and, as
in classic examples of groupthink, even make those positions
more extreme. Such algorithms are digital incarnations of our
dispositions to seek arguments that confirm what we believe,
but now unbounded by the limitations of a human reasoner
reasoning alone. One might envisage AI technologies trawling
the web to curate and present arguments, opinions and news
that challenge the beliefs of bubble dwellers. But is this what a
‘typical’ user would really want ?
Disclaimer: Any semblance of impartiality in the above re-
view is entirely coincidental (as you’d expect given my research
agenda).
Sanjay Modgil
Informatics, King’s College London
Uncertain Reasoning
I want to go to the cinema, and there are two cinemas I could
go to. One cinema is showing a boring documentary, and the
other is showing an exciting action movie. I prefer to watch the
action movie, so I should go to the cinema showing that one.
So I make up my mind to go to the action movie. This is a
pretty simple decision problem, but it seems like I have cho-
sen correctly. Going to that movie involves getting a bus across
town, it’s a hot day, the bus is crowded and the journey is un-
pleasant. I watch the movie and enjoy it (and enjoy it more than
I would have the documentary), then I get the bus back across
town, again standing in the unpleasant heat. I get home and
conclude that, all told, I would have enjoyed going to the local
cinema (just a few minutes walk away) to watch the less excit-
ing movie. What can we conclude from this story? There was
nothing wrong with how I solved my decision problem: I would
get more utility from the action movie than from the documen-
tary, so I should go to the action movie. That seems correct in
so far as it goes. The problem is that I solved the wrong de-
cision problem: the problem I was really interested in was the
one that took into account the disutility involved with travelling
across town on a hot day. We tend not to talk too much about
how we frame decision problems – about what counts as a good
way to frame a decision problem – but perhaps we should.
Last month I was at a





of people interested in the
theory of decision making
(economists, philosophers...)
but it also included several
speakers more focussed on
the practical side of decision
making: those who actually make decisions or who facilitate
decision making by others. One thing that struck me –
something that should have been obvious in hindsight – is that
the hard work of practical decision making is not in calculating
the expected utility (or whatever) but in actually framing the
decision problem in the first place.
When mathematical economists or philosophers want to dis-
cuss a decision problem, they typically take for granted that the
states, outcomes and acts are fixed exogenously, and the real
work is in working out what to do given that. When exper-
imental psychologists or behavioural economists try to elicit
subjects’ attitudes to various things, they will typically assume
that the subjects take the experimental setup at face value: the
urn really does have this many marbles of this and that colour
in it, the choices you have really are restricted to this or that bet
. . .
But when, say, the government of the Netherlands is deter-
mining its policy on flood defenses, it is hard work and re-
quires significant expertise to even frame the problem in terms
of the right states, outcomes and acts. For example, let’s
look at the Robust Decision Making framework developed by
the group at RAND. (See, for example, Lempert, Popper and
Bankes “Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods
for Quantitative, Long Term Policy Analysis”, RAND Corpo-
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ration) The process involves input from scientific experts (in
the flood example we’re talking hydrologists, climate scien-
tists, dam engineers, economists...) but also various stakehold-
ers (representatives of the people who live in the flood plain,
representatives of the government agencies who would main-
tain the flood defenses, wildlife protection agencies...).
And the process is dynamic: you send round your draft of
what decision you’re facing and encourage interested parties to
show you how you need to make your states more finegrained
(to account for causal factors you had considered irrelevant),
to add detail to the outcomes that you might originally have
thought unimportant, or to add new acts that you hadn’t con-
sidered. So in taking for granted the decision problem setup,
“theoretical” decision theorists are missing a lot of interesting
detail as to how real world decisions actually get made.
At this point, many people might be thinking “isn’t this just
Savage’s small world/grand world discussion again?” I don’t
think it is. Savage said that whenever we construct a decision
problem, we have to do it at a fairly coarse-grained level so as
to make it tractable: we construct a small world. We abstract
away from all the fine-grained but irrelevant detail (I care about
whether the coin lands heads, not about which direction pre-
cisely the nose of the head on the coin is facing). The point
here is that what is irrelevant, and what ought to be explicitly
taken into consideration in the decision problem, is a difficult
question; a question that requires input from all sorts of experts
and that requires real expertise to properly elicit.
What to conclude from this? First, I don’t want to suggest
that we’ve been doing decision theory all wrong! I think it
is perfectly OK for people to discuss what ideal agents would
do in particular situations, and they can stipulate that every-
thing not explicitly included in the state space is irrelevant to
the agent. Perhaps what I want to conclude is that there’s in-
teresting theoretical work to be done in looking more closely
at the practice of real-life decision making and asking ques-
tions like: “What is the right decision problem to solve?”
Seamus Bradley
Philosophy, University of Tilburg
Evidence-Based Medicine
Last month, an editorial was published in The BMJ on
the Evidence-based medicine manifesto for better health-
care. It was written by Carl Heneghan, Kamal R Mahtani,
Ben Goldacre, Fiona Godlee, Helen Macdonald, and Duncan
Jarvies.
The authors point out that ‘[i]nformed decision making re-
quires clinicians and patients to identify and integrate relevant
evidence’. But they argue that much of the available evidence
is poor quality or fails to be relevant to patient care:
Most published research is misleading to at least
some degree, impairing the implementation and up-
take of research findings into practice. Lack of up-
take into practice is compounded by poorly managed
commercial and academic vested interests; bias in the
research agenda (often because of the failure to take
account of the patient perspective in research ques-
tions and outcomes); poorly designed trials with a
lack of transparency and independent scrutiny that
fail to follow their protocol or stop early; ghost au-
thorship; publication and reporting biases; and re-
sults that are overinterpreted or misused, contain un-
corrected errors, or hide undetected fraud.
And they go on to provide a list of problems with current evi-
dence, including the problem that most research spending goes
to waste, the results from half of all trials are unpublished, and
the increasing cost of clinical drug trials is preventing the de-
velopment of new medicines.
However, the authors also provide a list of the steps required
for developing more trustworthy evidence: “Expand the role of
patients, health professionals, and policy makers in research;
Increase the systematic use of existing evidence; Make research
evidence relevant, replicable, and accessible to end users; Re-
duce questionable research practices, bias, and conflicts of in-
terests; Ensure drug and device regulation is robust, transpar-
ent, and independent; Produce better usable clinical guidelines;
Support innovation, quality improvement, and safety through
the better use of real world data; Educate professionals, policy
makers, and the public in evidence based healthcare to make an
informed choice; Encourage the next generation of leaders in
evidence based medicine”.
In order to take these steps towards improving the available
evidence, the authors invite others to contribute to the EBM
Manifesto:
It is an open invitation for others to contribute to and
join a movement towards better evidence by provid-
ing a roadmap for how to achieve the listed priorities
and to share the lessons from achievements already
made. Its aim is to complement and unite existing
efforts as well as create new ones.
More information is available on the manifesto page of Evi-
dence Live. There is also a video available outlining the project.
And there is a podcast interviewing Fiona Godlee and Carl







RMaC: Representation, Meaning, and Content, University of
Turin, 4–6 July.
VoKH: The Varieties of Knowing How, Essen, Germany, 6–7
July.
JD&RaR: Jonathan Dancy & Reasons and Reasoning, Saarland
University, Germany, 6–8 July.
SaAiP: Symmetries and Asymmetries in Physics, Leibniz-
University Hannover, 6–8 July.
AAfL: Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic,
University of Adelaide, 6–8 July.
MitP: Making it (too?) precise, University of Geneva, 7–8 July.
PA: Philosophical Analysis, Krakow, Poland, 7–9 July.
PLS: Panhellenic Logic Symposium, Delphi, Greece, 12–16
July.
MM: Multilevel Modeling Using HLM workshop, University
of Connecticut, 17–21 July.
OCL&TM: Workshop in OCL and Textual Modeling, Marburg,
Germany, 20 July.
YSM: Young Statisticians Meeting, Keele University, 27–28
July.
August
MLwG: Mining and Learning with Graphs, Halifax, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada, 14 August.
CW: Causality Workshop: Learning, Inference, and Decision-
Making, Sydney, Australia, 15 August.
LFoUaL: Logical Foundations for Uncertainty and Learning,
Melbourne, Australia, 19 August.




EASSS: 19th European Agent Systems Summer School
Gdansk, Poland, 7–11 September.
Computer Simulation Methods: Summer School, High Perfor-
mance Computing Center Stuttgart (HLRS), 25–29 September.
Programmes
APhil: MA/PhD in Analytic Philosophy, University of
Barcelona.
Master Programme: MA in Pure and Applied Logic, Univer-
sity of Barcelona.
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Language, Mind and
Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich,
Switzerland.
HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science and
Medicine, Durham University.
Master Programme: in Statistics, University College Dublin.
LoPhiSC: Master in Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epis-
temology, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Paris-
Sorbonne University (Paris 4).
Master Programme: in Artificial Intelligence, Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
Master Programme: Philosophy and Economics, Institute of
Philosophy, University of Bayreuth.
MA in Cognitive Science: School of Politics, International
Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast.
MA in Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics: Department
of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA Programmes: in Philosophy of Science, University of
Leeds.
MA in Logic and Philosophy of Science: Faculty of Philosophy,
Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion, LMU Munich.
MA in Logic and Theory of Science: Department of Logic of
the Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary.
MA in Metaphysics, Language, and Mind: Department of Phi-
losophy, University of Liverpool.
MA in Mind, Brain and Learning: Westminster Institute of Ed-
ucation, Oxford Brookes University.
MA in Philosophy: by research, Tilburg University.
MA in Philosophy, Science and Society: TiLPS, Tilburg Uni-
versity.
MA in Philosophy of Biological and Cognitive Sciences: De-
partment of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA in Rhetoric: School of Journalism, Media and Communi-
cation, University of Central Lancashire.
MA programmes: in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics,
and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Birm-
ingham.
MRes in Methods and Practices of Philosophical Research:
Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.
MSc in Applied Statistics: Department of Economics, Mathe-
matics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London.
MSc in Applied Statistics and Datamining: School of Mathe-
matics and Statistics, University of St Andrews.
MSc in Artificial Intelligence: Faculty of Engineering, Uni-
versity of Leeds.
MA in Reasoning
A programme at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Gain
the philosophical background required for a PhD in this area.
Optional modules available from Psychology, Computing,
Statistics, Social Policy, Law, Biosciences and History.
MSc in Cognitive & Decision Sciences: Psychology, University
College London.
MSc in Cognitive Systems: Language, Learning, and Reason-
ing, University of Potsdam.
MSc in Cognitive Science: University of Osnabru¨ck, Germany.
MSc in Cognitive Psychology/Neuropsychology: School of
Psychology, University of Kent.
MSc in Logic: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
University of Amsterdam.
MSc in Mind, Language & Embodied Cognition: School of
Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of
Edinburgh.
MSc in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society: Uni-
versity of Twente, The Netherlands.
MRes in Cognitive Science and Humanities: Language, Com-
munication and Organization: Institute for Logic, Cognition,
Language, and Information, University of the Basque Country
(Donostia San Sebastia´n).
Open Mind: International School of Advanced Studies in Cog-
nitive Sciences, University of Bucharest.
Research Master in Philosophy and Economics: Erasmus Uni-




Lecturer: in Practical Philosophy, University of Kent, dead-
line 1 July.
Post-doc: in Vagueness and Indeterminacy, University of Mi-
lan, deadline 3 July.
Lectureship: in Logic/Epistemology, University of Oxford,
deadline 4 July.
Research Associate: in Machine Learning and Neuroimaging,
University College London, deadline 8 July.
Post-doc: in Econometrics and Statistics, University of Min-
ster, Germany, deadline 15 July.
Post-doc: in Statistical Methods, University of Bergamo, Italy,
deadline 21 July.
Associate Professorship: in Statistics, University of Oxford,
deadline 30 August.
Postdoctoral Fellowships: British Academy, deadline 6 Octo-
ber.
Studentships
3 PhD’s: in Didactics of Mathematics and interactions with
Informatics, University of Montpellier, France, deadline open.
PhD: in Epistemology/Philosophy of Mind, University of Fri-
bourg, Switzerland, deadline 30 September.
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